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Abstract

The literature disagrees on the link between so-called busy boards (where many independent directors
hold multiple board seats) and firm performance. Some argue that busyness certifies a director’s ability
and that such directors are value enhancing. Others argue that “over-boarded” directors are ineffective
and detract from firm value. We find evidence that (1) the disparate results in prior work stem from
differences in both sample composition and empirical design, (2) on balance the results suggest a
negative association between board busyness and firm performance, and (3) the inclusion of firm fixed

effects dramatically affects the conclusions drawn from, and the explanatory power of, multivariate
analyses. We also explore alternative empirical definitions of what constitutes a busy director and find
that commonly used proxies for busyness perform well relative to more complex alternatives.

Highlights

► The disparate busy director findings result from different samples and methodology. ► Including
firm fixed effects results in a constant negative relation. ► The common busy director definition is as
informative as more intense alternatives.
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1. Introduction
The link between busy directors (independent directors with multiple board appointments) and firm
performance is an issue of debate in the literature. Some argue that multiple directorships are a
certification of a director’s abilities (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, busy directors should
positively affect firm performance. Others argue that busy directors are less effective due to the
increased time commitment associated with multiple board appointments. Therefore, the presence of
directors with multiple board seats should negatively influence firm performance.
Two of the more recent papers that exemplify this debate are Ferris et al., 2003, Fich and Shivdasani,
2006. Ferris et al. (2003) finds that the past performance of the firms on which a director serves is
positively associated with the number of board seats that he hold and that firms appointing a new
director with multiple board seats experience positive announcement returns. These results suggest
that the market perceives the appointment of an independent director with multiple board seats as
value enhancing. In contrast, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms where directors have multiple
board seats tend to have lower market to book ratios and are less likely to fire a CEO in response to
poor performance. Furthermore, the announcement of a director accepting his or her third board seat
negatively affects the value of other firms where the individual is a board member. Fich and Shivdasani
(2006) argue that directors with multiple appointments are busy; therefore, they are less able to
effectively monitor and advise management, which adversely affects firm performance. This
perspective is echoed by institutional investors proposing “best practices”, that would limit the
number of board seats a director can hold. Reports further suggest that institutional investors are
taking a harder stance against CEOs serving on multiple boards. More generally, time commitments for
board members appear to be on the increase, with even one directorship taking an average time
commitment of 228 hours in 2011, according to the National Association of Corporate Directors (see
Lublin, 2012).
We reexamine the impact of busy directors on firm performance, with emphasis on reconciling the
contradictory findings in the literature. In addition to exploring alternate empirical approaches, we
investigate whether or not the results are robust to more comprehensive definitions of what
constitutes a busy director. Our goal is to reconcile the disparate findings in the literature and provide

guidance for those examining board structure and busyness from an empirical standpoint. We
acknowledge the omnipotent endogeneity concerns in this type of analysis and, while we do explore
the direction of causality, our approach is to use representative analyses consistent with prior work in
order to focus on the conflicting results.1
Using a more recent sample we first revisit the results of Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, Ferris et al., 2003.
Focusing on S&P 500, firms we find evidence of a negative association between busy directors and firm
performance, consistent with Fich and Shivdasani’s (2006) analysis of the Forbes 500. However, when
we examine a broader sample including non-S&P 500 firms, we find evidence of a positive link between
busy directors and firm performance, consistent with Ferris et al. (2003) analysis of more than three
thousand COMPUSTAT firms. Our ability to find results consistent with the findings of both Fich and
Shivdasani, 2006, Ferris et al., 2003 suggests that the conflicting findings are attributable to differences
in the samples studied or other aspects of the empirical design.
With regard to empirical design, Brookman and Thistle, 2011, Coles and Li, 2011, and Graham et al.
(2012), highlight the importance of controlling for unobservable firm characteristics. These papers
report that controlling for firm fixed effects changes previously documented relations in the CEO
compensation literature. Thus, in the spirit of this work, and consistent with the approach of Fich and
Shivdasani (2006), we also examine how the inclusion of firm fixed effects influences the empirical
association between busy directors and firm performance. Furthermore, we explore how controlling
for firm fixed effects impacts the overall explanatory power of our models. Finally, we explore whether
the relation between busy directors and firm performance differs pre- and post-Sarbanes Oxley.
Our results suggest that the contradictory findings in the literature are attributable to differences in
both the samples studied and empirical design. Notably the inclusion or exclusion of smaller firms and
firm fixed effects materially impacts the inferences drawn regarding busy directors. Specifically, when
smaller firms are included in the sample we observe evidence of a positive relation between busy
directors and firm performance. Once we control for firm fixed effects, we find a consistent negative
relation between busy directors and firm performance, regardless of sample composition. Moreover,
the adjusted-R2 of our models increases dramatically with the inclusion of firm fixed effects, suggesting
that unobserved firm heterogeneity is also important in explaining the variation in firm performance.
We also find evidence suggesting that busy boards lead to lower firm values, and that this association
has weakened following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.
Finally, we examine alternative measures of what constitutes a busy director and thus a busy board.
We start with the definition that is increasingly used in the literature whereby an independent director
serving on three or more boards is classified as busy.2 However we also explore different proxies for
director busyness. Our alternative busyness measures are designed to account for the differential time
and effort required to serve on the boards of different firms. For example, board service for a director
on a small single-product line company may be less onerous than serving on the board of a fast
growing and complex multinational corporation.
We find evidence that the relatively straightforward definition of busy directors (and thus busy boards)
is as informative as the more complex, and data intensive, alternatives that we examine. Specifically,
we find relatively high correlations between the traditional definitions of board busyness and the

alternatives that we construct. Additionally, the empirical relations we observe with the alternative
measures are qualitatively similar to those of the traditional measures, and they have similar
explanatory power.
In Section 2 we review the relevant literature and highlight the disparate results. Section 3 outlines the
data and variables used in the study while in Section 4 we report our primary findings. In Section 5 we
explore alternative measures of director busyness. Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature review
The evidence on the association between busy directors and firm value is mixed. Fama and Jensen
(1983) argue that directors who demonstrate their ability as monitors are rewarded with additional
board appointments. Consistent with this view, Brickley et al. (1999) find that the likelihood that a
retired CEO sits on his own board or other boards is positively associated with the performance of his
firm while he was CEO. More recently, Ferris et al. (2003) find that the better the performance of firms
at which the director serves, the more likely the director is to hold more board seats going forward.
Conversely, Gilson (1990) finds that directors at financially distressed firms hold fewer board seats in
the future. Similarly, Shivdasani, 1993, Harford, 2003 report that outside directors at firms that are the
target of a hostile takeover attempt hold fewer board seats going forward. The findings that directors
associated with better performing firms hold more directorships, while those associated with poor
performing firms hold fewer, are consistent with multiple board seats certifying director quality.
Therefore, these results suggest a positive relation between busy directors and firm performance.
Additional evidence consistent with the assertion that multiple directorships certify director quality can
be found in Beasley, 1996, Cotter et al., 1997, Brown and Maloney, 1999, Ferris et al., 2003, amongst
others. Beasley (1996) finds that firms whose outside directors hold more board seats are less likely to
commit fraud. Cotter et al. (1997) report that when a merger target’s board includes individuals with
multiple board seats, the merger premium offered is higher. Similarly, Brown and Maloney (1999) find
higher acquirer returns when directors with multiple board seats serve on the acquirer’s board. Lastly,
Ferris et al. (2003) report positive returns when firms announce the appointment of a director with
multiple board seats.
In contrast to the certification view, some researchers argue that directors over-commit themselves as
they take on multiple board seats and this reduces their efficacy as advisors and monitors. Related to
this, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) examine CEO involvement with the nomination of new directors
and find that CEOs tend to select directors who (1) are predisposed to monitor management less and
(2) have multiple board seats. Further, Core et al. (1999) report that CEO compensation is higher when
outside directors hold multiple board seats, while Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms where the
majority of outside directors have multiple board seats have worse performance and are less likely to
fire a CEO for poor performance. More recently, Ahn et al. (2010) find that acquiring firms where
directors hold more seats experience more negative acquisition announcement returns while Jiraporn
et al. (2008) report larger diversification discounts when directors hold multiple board seats (an effect
that is exacerbated at firms with weaker shareholder rights).

Fich and Shivdasani (2006) also find evidence of positive announcement returns when a busy director
leaves a board, and they find that in response to news of a director accepting a third board seat, the
incumbent firm experiences a negative announcement return. Additionally, Jiraporn et al. (2009) find
that busier directors are more likely to miss board meetings, consistent with directors becoming over
committed. Lastly, Jiraporn et al. (2009) find a U-shaped relationship between the number of board
seats a director holds and the number of board committees he serves on. Specifically, when a director
sits on a small number of boards, he serves on fewer committees suggesting, the director is busy.
However, as a director sits on more boards, he serves on more committees, supporting the reputation
hypothesis.
The discussion above outlines the debate and highlights the contradictory results in the literature. Both
views are intuitively appealing, and both have empirical support in the literature. We attempt to
reconcile the findings in the prior literature by using a representative analysis of how firm value is
associated with board structure. Specifically, we focus on how differences in experimental design
influence the link between board busyness and firm value. In doing so, we focus on sample differences,
the specific methodologies used, and various proxies for director busyness.

3. Data
3.1. Sample construction

Using RiskMetrics, we obtain director and board-level data including name, age, ownership, board
tenure, independence, committee appointments, and whether or not the director is a current CEO.
Firm-level accounting and financial data are from COMPUSTAT, while stock market data are from
Center for Research in Security Prices (hereafter CRSP). We exclude financial and utility firms and
exclude observations where all the required data is not available. This results in a sample of 11,494
firm-years from 1999–2008.3Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Variable

All firms

S&P 500 firms

Non-S&P 500 firms

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Tobin’s Q

2.03

1.60

2.25

1.79

1.93

1.53

Return on assets

0.13

0.13

0.16

0.15

0.13

0.12

Return on sales

0.14

0.13

0.19

0.17

0.12

0.12

Sales/assets

1.12

0.96

1.05

0.90

1.15

1.00

Operating margin

0.13

0.13

0.15

0.15

0.12

0.12

Total assets

6,059

1,344

17,231

7,039

1,372

792

Total sales

4,851

1,305

12,978

6,307

1,441

804

Board ownership

1.22

1.00

1.16

1.00

1.25

1.00

Board size

8.94

9.00

10.50

10.00

8.29

8.00

Firm characteristics

Variable

All firms

S&P 500 firms

Non-S&P 500 firms

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Independent directors (%)

0.69

0.71

0.75

0.77

0.67

0.67

Busy directors (%)

0.16

0.11

0.27

0.25

0.11

0.00

Busy board

0.09

0.00

0.19

0.00

0.05

0.00

Average # of directorships

1.62

1.50

1.99

1.88

1.47

1.33

Firm age

22.76

16.00

34.71

32.00

17.75

13.00

Number of segments

2.36

2.00

2.72

3.00

2.21

2.00

Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics the firm and board characteristics. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the
market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s
assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s
assets at the end of the year. Return on assets is calculated as operating income before depreciation plus the
decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other
current assets scaled by the average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total assets. Return on sales is
computed as operating income over net sales. Operating margin is estimated as annual operating income
standardized by total assets. Total assets and total sales are those reported by Compustat at year-end. Board
size is the firm’s total number of directors. Board ownership is a quintile ranking of the percent of the firm’s
total outstanding equity held by the firm’s directors. Independent directors (%) is the number of independent
directors divided by board size. Busy Directors (%) is the percentage of independent directors who are busy,
Busy Board is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a majority of the independent directors are busy,
and zero otherwise. Average # of Directorships is the total number of directorships held by independent board
members divided by the number of independent directors. Firm age is the number of years the firm has been in
the CRSP database. Number of segments is the number of business segments reported by COMPUSTAT.

Similar to Ferris et al. (2003), we report the distribution of directors in our sample based on the
number of board seats they hold in Table 2. Consistent with Ferris et al. (2003) we see that the
percentage of directors holding multiple seats falls as the number of seats held increases. For example,
we find that 28.3% of directors hold two board seats, while less than 0.02% hold ten seats. Ferris et al.
(2003) report that more than 84% of their director sample holds just one board seat; the
corresponding statistics for our sample is 47.4%. That is, the majority of directors in our sample serve
on multiple boards. We also note that directors who serve on the boards of S&P 500 companies are
more likely to serve on multiple boards relative to non-S&P 500 directors. Specifically, we find that only
35.4% of S&P directors hold a single board seat, while this percentage increases to 52.4% for non-S&P
500 directors.
Table 2. Distribution of directorships held.
Directorships held

All firms: Directors

S&P 500 directors

Non-S&P 500 directors

1

5449

47.41%

1205

35.47%

4244

52.41%

2

3255

28.32%

1034

30.44%

2221

27.43%

3

1701

14.80%

677

19.93%

1024

12.65%

4

701

6.10%

296

8.71%

405

5.00%

5

245

2.13%

116

3.41%

129

1.59%

Directorships held

All firms: Directors

S&P 500 directors

Non-S&P 500 directors

6

78

0.68%

37

1.09%

41

0.51%

7

46

0.40%

20

0.59%

26

0.32%

8

17

0.15%

11

0.32%

6

0.07%

10

2

0.02%

1

0.03%

1

0.01%

Total directors

11,494

3397

8097

Number of firms

2077

532

1545

Notes: We report the distribution of directors based on the number of directorships held. We report the number
and percentage of individual directors holding the reported number of board seats for the full sample, the S&P
500, and the non-S&P 500.

3.2. Busy director proxies

We use several different measures to capture the concept of director busyness. We classify these
measures into two broad groups: (1) conventional measures used in the prior literature and (2)
alternative measures that are designed to capture the nuances of busyness. We focus on independent
directors as these directors are primarily responsible for monitoring management while inside
directors are potentially on boards for other reasons.4
The conventional busy measures we use are the Fich and Shivdasani (2006)Percentage of busy
directors which is the percentage of independent directors that are busy, where a director is
considered to be busy if he or she serves on three or more boards, and the Busy board indicator, which
takes the value of 1 if over 50% of the firm’s independent directors are busy. Additionally, we calculate
the Average number of directorships – the mean number of board seats held by independent directors
– used by Ferris et al. (2003). These are relatively simple measures, treating all directorships the same.
However, as noted earlier, one might expect that the demands on a director’s time will vary with the
characteristics of the firms where the director serves. That is, board service for a director on a small
single-product line company may be less onerous than serving on the board of a fast growing complex
multinational corporation. Thus, our alternative proxies for busy are designed to account for the
differential time and effort required to serve at different firms.
We attempt to capture different firm and director characteristics that likely place greater demands on
a director’s time. At a general level we focus on two dimensions: (1) the complexity of the firms at
which the director serves and (2) additional time commitments that the individual may face. To proxy
for complexity we focus on firm size, the number of business segments, and R&D intensity. Our priors
are that these firm characteristics are associated with the time and effort required of the director to
monitor and advise management. For time commitments we track whether or not the individual is a
sitting executive at another S&P 1500 firm, serves on numerous board committees (as defined below),
and whether or not the director serves on the boards of firms operating in different industries. Our
expectation is that sitting executives will have less time available for monitoring and advising because
of the requirements of their careers. Similarly, directors serving on numerous committees have less
time available and this in turn impinges on their ability to monitor and advise management.5 Lastly,
serving on the boards of firms in diverse industries require more effort in order for the director to
remain informed on industry-specific developments across multiple industries.

Our complexity measures are: Busy directors serving at a large firm (%) is the proportion of
independent directors serving on three or more boards, where at least one of those firms has assets
above the sample median; Busy directors serving firms with multiple business segments (%) is the
fraction of independent directors serving on three or more boards, where at least one firm has more
business segments than the sample median; Busy directors serving firms with large R&D expenditures
(%) is the percentage of independent directors serving on three or more boards, where at least one
firm has R&D expenditures above the sample median. Our time constraint measures are: Busy directors
serving as insiders at their firm (%) is the percentage of independent directors serving on three or more
boards, where they serve as an inside director on their employer’s board; Busy directors with multiple
committees (%) is the percentage of independent directors serving on three or more boards who also
serve on more than four committees (which is the median number of committee appointments for
independent directors). Busy directors serving different industries (%) is the percentage of independent
directors serving on three or more boards, where at least two firms are in different Fama–French 48
industries.

3.3. Dependent variables

For purposes of comparison we generally follow the empirical approach of Fich and Shivdasani (2006).
We focus primarily on the relation between busy directors and Tobin’s Q, but we also examine Return
on Assets (ROA), Sales as a Percent of Assets, and Return on Sales (ROS). We calculate Tobin’s Q as the
market value of the firm’s equity plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and
equity, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets all measured at the end of the year.6 We calculate
ROA as the sum of operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the
decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets,
divided by the average of the beginning and year end book value of total assets. Sales as a Percent of
Assets is calculated as sales divided by the average of beginning and year end book value of total
assets. Return on Sales is calculated as the sum of operating income before depreciation plus the
decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease
in other current assets, divided by sales.

3.4. Control variables

We control for: the natural log of the number of directorships held by the firm’s CEO; the presence of a
director with industry expertise (specifically, a director who serves on at least three boards where the
majority of the firms are in the same industry as the firm); director ownership; board interlocks (where
the firm’s CEO sits on an outside director’s board); CEO ownership; the log of board size; the number of
standing board committees; the percentage of independent directors; ROA; log sales; firm age; growth
opportunities (measured as depreciation expense scaled by total sales) and the number of business
segments. A detailed explanation of each of the variables we examine is presented in Appendix B.
While we do not control for board meeting frequency, as meeting frequency is missing for
approximately 16% of our sample, in unreported tests controlling for meeting frequency we obtain
qualitatively similar results.

4. Empirical results
4.1. Tobin’s Q

Table 3 reports the results of our multivariate analysis of the relation between busy directors and firm
performance. Panel A presents evidence consistent with Ferris et al. (2003) that busy directors are
associated with improved firm performance. Whether we examine the proportion of busy directors,
the busy board indicator (Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Models 1 and 2), or average directorships (Ferris
et al. (2003), Model 3), we find a positive association between busy directors and Tobin’s Q. This
suggests that the cross-sectional results of Ferris et al. (2003) are robust to different proxies for
director busyness and the use of samples from different time periods.
Table 3. Busy directors and Tobin’s Q.
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

Panel A: All firms
Board characteristics
Busy directors (%)

0.456***

Busy board (1/0)

0.160***

Average # directorships

0.180***

Control variables
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

No

No

No

17.08%

16.76%

16.98%

Adjusted

R2

Panel B: S&P 500 firms
Board characteristics
Busy independent directors (%)

−0.294***

Busy board (1/0)

−0.130**

Average # directorships

−0.091**

Control variables
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

No

No

No

Adjusted R2

36.83%

36.82%

36.86%

Panel C: Non-S&P 500 firms
Board characteristics

Variables

(1)

Busy independent directors (%)

0.357***

Busy board (1/0)

(2)

(3)

0.174**

Average # directorships

0.152***

Control variables
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

No

No

No

18.89

18.70

18.79

Adjusted

R2

(%)

Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the association between busy directors and
Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the
difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the
year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. Busy directors (%) is the percentage of
independent directors that hold three or more directorships. Busy board (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to
one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold three or more directorships. Average #
directorships is the total number of directorships held by the firm’s independent directors, divided by the
number of independent directors. We control for year and industry fixed effects. A list of the other control
variables used and details regarding their calculation is provided in Appendix B. Panel A presents the results for
the full sample, while Panels B and C report the results for the S&P 500 and non-S&P-500 sub-samples
respectively.
*
Statistical significance at the 10% level, respectively.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level, respectively.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level, respectively.

Of note, however, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) examine a panel of Fortune 500 firms between 1989 and
1995, while Ferris et al. (2003) analysis is of a cross-section of more than 3000 COMPUSTAT firms in
1995. Thus, it is possible that the different sample selection procedure accounts for the disparate
empirical findings. We explore this possibility in Panels B and C of Table 3 where we split the sample
into S&P 500 firms (Panel B) and non-S&P 500 firms (Panel C). In Panel B we see that Tobin’s Q is
inversely related to the presence of busy directors for S&P 500 firms, consistent with Fich and
Shivdasani (2006). However, in Panel C for the non-S&P 500 firms, the opposite is true – that is,
consistent with the Ferris et al. (2003) findings, there is a positive association between busy directors
and Tobin’s Q.
Our ability to replicate the results of these two papers by splitting the sample based on S&P 500
membership (to approximate the different sample selection methodologies of the two papers)
suggests a possible explanation for the different conclusions. Namely, that the relation between busy
directors and firm performances is contingent on the type of firm examined. Additionally, our results
suggest a possible explanation as to why Fich and Shivdasani (2006) were unable to reproduce the
Ferris et al. (2003) findings. Ferris et al. (2003) examines a sample that is dominated by smaller nonFortune 500 (and non-S&P 500) firms, for which our results suggest a positive relation between busy
directors and performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) examine only Fortune 500 companies, where

our results suggest a negative relation between busy directors and performance for similar firms. The
focus on larger companies by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) likely precluded them from finding evidence
of a negative relation between busy directors and performance. While our results suggest the
importance of sample selection for the previously documented findings, we note that the results of
both papers are robust in the sense that we can replicate them for a more recent time period.
Of course, the use of different empirical approaches may also be important in explaining the different
results from these papers. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that fixed effects analysis offers more
reliable estimates. Consistent with this, Brookman and Thistle, 2011, Coles and Li, 2011, and Graham et
al. (2012), suggest the need to control for unobservable firm characteristics when analyzing corporate
finance issues. Specifically, these papers find that including firm fixed effects alters previously
documented results when examining CEO pay.
Table 4 presents the results of our analysis when we include firm fixed effects. Panel A reports results
for the full sample and Panels B and C report the results for the S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 samples,
respectively. Once we control for firm fixed effects, we find a consistent negative relation between
busy directors and firm performance, regardless of the sample examined or the busy director proxy
used. These results demonstrate the importance of controlling for firm fixed effects. Absent a control
for fixed effects, the relation between busy directors and firm performance appears to be sample
specific. However, once we control for firm fixed effects, we find a consistent negative relation
between busy directors and performance. Additionally, we note the significant increase in our adjusted
R2. The inclusion of fixed effects increases our explanatory power by 100–300%.
Table 4. Busy directors and Tobin’s Q controlling for firm-fixed effects.
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

Panel A: All firms
Board characteristics
Busy directors (%)

−0.145**

Busy board (1/0)

−0.019

Average # directorships

−0.054**

Control variables
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

68.54%

68.53%

68.54%

Panel B: S&P 500 firms
Board characteristics
Busy independent directors (%)
Busy board (1/0)

−0.324***
−0.085*

Variables

(1)

(2)

Average # directorships

(3)
−0.083*

Control variables
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

72.69%

72.69%

72.74%

Panel C: Non-S&P 500 firms
Board characteristics
Busy independent directors (%)

−0.206**

Busy board (1/0)

−0.102*

Average # directorships

−0.109***

Control variables
Board and firm controls (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

70.66

70.63

70.63

Adjusted

R2

(%)

Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the association between busy directors and
Tobin’s Q controlling for firm-fixed effects. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the
end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s
equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. Busy directors
(%) is the percentage of independent directors that hold three or more directorships. Busy board (1/0) is an
indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold three or more
directorships. Average # directorships is the total number of directorships held by the firm’s independent
directors, divided by the number of independent directors. We control for year and industry fixed effects. A list
of the other control variables used and details regarding their calculation is provided in Appendix B. Panel A
presents the results for the full sample, while Panels B and C report the results for the S&P 500 and non-S&P500 sub-samples respectively.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level respectively.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level respectively.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level respectively.

While the coefficients on our busy director measures are all negative, the busy board indicator is not
statistically significant in the full sample analysis but is significant in both sub-samples. This is
somewhat surprising but is potentially explained by a structural break between the two sub-samples.7
That is, while busy boards are negatively associated with firm performance in both sub-samples, the
full sample analysis fails to control for the structural differences between S&P 500 and non-S&P 500
firms.

We examine the economic significance of this relation by focusing on the subsample analyses
presented in Table 4 Panels B and C; we estimate the change to average Tobin’s Q for each
specification. We find that, from Model 1, if one non-busy independent director was to become busy,
then Tobin’s Q would decline by approximately 1.98% for the S&P 500 and 1.93% for the non-S&P 500
firms. In Model 2, if the board were to become busy, it would result in a decline of 3.78% and 5.28% for
the S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms, respectively. Finally, based on Model 3, if the average number of
directorships were to increase by one then, the decline in Tobin’s Q would be 3.69% and 5.65% for the
S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 firms, respectively.

4.2. Sarbanes–Oxley

Jiraporn et al. (2009) report that busy directors’ behavior has changed since the passage of Sarbanes–
Oxley (SOX) in 2002 in that they are less likely to miss board meetings post-SOX. Therefore, it is
reasonable to expect that the relation between busy directors and firm performance might also have
changed post-SOX. We address this issue in Table 5. Following Jiraporn et al. (2009) we create a postSOX indicator variable, which we interact with our busyness proxies.8 While we find that busy directors
and Tobin’s Q are negatively related, we find some evidence suggesting that the relation has weakened
post-SOX. Specifically, the interaction between the average number of directorships and the post-SOX
indicator is significantly positive, while the busy independent director (%) and busy board interactions
are both positive and insignificant. This is consistent with the Jiraporn et al. (2009) assertion that SOX
has motivated directors to act more responsibly.
Table 5. Busy directors and Tobin’s Q: pre and post-SOX.
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

Board characteristics
Busy independent directors (%)

−0.236***

Busy independent directors (%)⁎ post-SOX

0.103

Busy board (1/0)

−0.045

Busy board (1/0)⁎ post-SOX

0.019

Average # directorships rectors

−0.095***

Average # directorships ⁎ post-SOX

0.056***

Control variables
Board and firm characteristics (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

67.44

67.41

67.48

Adjusted

R2

(%)

Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the association between busy directors and
Tobin’s Q controlling for firm-fixed effects. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the
end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s
equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. Busy directors
(%) is the percentage of independent directors that hold three or more directorships. Busy board (1/0) is the
indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold three or more

directorships. Average # directorships is the total number of directorships held by the firm’s independent
directors, divided by the number of independent directors. We control for year and industry fixed effects. A list
of the other control variables used and details regarding their calculation is provided in Appendix B. Panel A
presents the results for the full sample, while Panels B and C report the results for the S&P 500 and non-S&P500 sub-samples respectively.
**
Statistical significance at the 5% level, respectively.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level, respectively.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level, respectively.

4.3. Causality

The results presented in Table 4, Table 5 suggest that busy directors are over committed, limiting their
ability to monitor and advise management, which diminishes firm performance. However, the results
do not allow us to identify causality. Busy directors may lead to lower Tobin’s Q, as argued by the
literature, or firms with lower Tobin’s Q may appoint more busy directors to their boards in order to
implement change. To explore the direction of causality we use an approach analogous to that of
Jiraporn et al. (2009). Specifically, we replace our busyness proxies with their respected lagged values
and re-estimate the analysis in Panel A of Table 4 using 1, 2, and 3 year lags. The rationale is that
director busyness in prior years could not have been caused by the firm’s Tobin’s Q in subsequent
years.9
The untabulated results are consistent with those reported in Panel A of Table 4 in that we find
negative relations between busyness and Tobin’s Q. Specifically, busy independent director (%) and
average directorships held by independent directors are significantly negative, while the coefficient for
the busy board indicator is negative but insignificant. On balance, these results lend support to the
contention that busy directors detract from firm performance.

4.4. Alternative performance measures

The analysis above suggests that busy directors are negatively associated with firm performance.
However, the analysis relies on Tobin’s Q, which potentially suffers from significant measurement
error. To ensure that our results are not driven by issues with Tobin’s Q, we supplement our analysis by
examining several alternative measures of firm performance. Following Fich and Shivdasani (2006) we
examine return on assets, sales as a percent of assets and return on sales. In Table 6 we limit our
analysis to the full sample and control for firm fixed effects, although we obtain qualitatively similar
results in both the S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 sub-samples (not tabled).
Table 6. Busy directors and operating performance.
Variables

ROA
(1)

Busy independent
directors (%)
Busy board (1/0)
Average #
directorships

Sales/assets
(2)

(3)

−0.009*

(1)

(2)

ROS
(3)

−0.053***
−0.005**

(2)

(3)

−0.023**
−0.007

−0.004*

(1)

−0.01**
−0.018***

−0.008**

Variables

ROA

Sales/assets

ROS

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Board and firm
characteristics (Fich Yes
and Shivdasani, 2006)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

77.71

77.71

77.70

92.93

92.93 92.93

77.99

77.99 77.99

Control variables

Adjusted

R2

(%)

Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the association between busy directors and
firm performance using alternative firm performance proxies. Return on assets is calculated as operating income
before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities,
and the decrease in other current assets scaled by the average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total
assets. Sales/assets is total sales divided by total assets. Return on sales is computed as operating income over
net sales. Busy directors (%) is the percentage of independent directors that hold three or more directorships.
Busy board (1/0) is an indicator variable equal to one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold
three or more directorships. Average # directorships is the total number of directorships held by the firm’s
independent directors divided by the number of independent directors. We control for year-, industry-, and firm
fixed-effects. A list of the other control variables used and details regarding their calculation is provided in
Appendix B.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level, respectively.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level, respectively.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level, respectively.

We see that all of the busy director proxies are negatively and significantly related to both ROA and
ROS. While all three busy director proxies are negatively related to sales as a percent of assets, the
busy board indicator is not statistically significant. The results presented in Table 6 suggest that busy
directors are negatively related to firm performance, and that our previously observed relation is not
driven by issues with Tobin’s Q.

5. Alternative measures of director busyness
5.1. Alternative board seat thresholds

The analysis thus far follows the prior literature and assumes that directors become busy when they sit
on three or more boards. We now examine how changing this definition of director busyness impacts
the relation between busy directors and firm performances. Specifically, we reclassify directors as busy
if they (1) serve on two or more boards or (2) four or more boards. Using these various classifications
of busy directors, we re-estimate the relation between busy directors and firm performance.
Moreover, we focus our analysis on the percentage of busy directors as it provides more consistent
results than the busy board indicator or the average number of directorships.10

These results, presented in Table 7, suggest that the negative association between busy directors and
firm performance is strongest when the definition of busy is a director serving on three or more
boards. When we use the two board seat cutoff, the percentage of busy independent directors is only
significantly related to sales as a percent of assets. Using the four board seat cutoff, the percentage of
busy directors is only significantly related to Tobin’s Q and ROS. While using the three boards cut off,
the percentage of busy directors is significantly negatively related to all of our firm performance
measures. This suggests that classifying directors on three or more boards as busy is robust from an
empirical perspective.
Table 7. Firm Performance Regressions with alternative thresholds for busyness.
Model Measures of busy independent directors

Dependent
variables
Tobin’s Q

ROA

−0.049

−0.006 −0.035**

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year and Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2 (%)

68.53

77.71

92.93

77.97

Busy directors (⩾3) (%)

−0.145**

−0.009* −0.053***

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year and industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2 (%)

68.54

77.71

92.93

77.99

Busy directors (⩾4) (%)

−0.207**

−0.007 −0.018

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year and Industry effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

68.54

77.70

92.93

77.98

Busy directors (⩾2) (%)

Sales/assets ROS
−0.004

Control variables
(1)

Board and firm characteristics (Fich and
Shivdasani, 2006)

−0.023**

Control variables
(2)

Board and firm characteristics (Fich and
Shivdasani, 2006)

−0.025*

Control variables
(3)

Board and firm characteristics (Fich and
Shivdasani, 2006)

Adjusted

R2

(%)

Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the association between busy directors and
firm performance using alternative definitions of what constitutes a busy director. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the
market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book value of the firm’s
assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the book value of the firm’s
assets at the end of the year. Return on assets is calculated as operating income before depreciation plus the
decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other
current assets scaled by the average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total assets. Sales/assets is
total sales divided by total assets. Return on sales is computed as operating income over net sales. Busy
directors (%) is the percentage of independent directors that hold: (1) Two or more directorships in Model 1, (2)
three or more directorships in Model 2, and (3) four or more directorships in Model 3. We control for year-,
industry-, and firm-fixed effects. A list of the other control variables used and details regarding their calculation
is provided in Appendix B.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level, respectively.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level, respectively.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level, respectively.

5.2. Complexity and commitment measures

To identify busy directors, the prior literature focuses exclusively on the number of directorships an
individual holds: Core et al., 1999, Ferris et al., 2003, Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, Jiraporn et al., 2008,
Jiraporn et al., 2009, Jiraporn et al., 2009, Ahn et al., 2010. While this is an intuitive approach, it fails to
address the possibility that the demands placed on a director are different across firms. For example,
all else equal, complex firms (i.e. those with many business segments) are more likely to require more
time and effort from their directors than a firm with only a single business segment. Therefore, if two
directors both serve on three boards, but one director serves on the board of more complex firms and
all else is equal, then this director is busier.
Surprisingly, these various dimensions of busyness have not been addressed in-depth in prior work.
Thus, in this section we explore how alternative busyness measures designed to capture variation in
the time and effort needed to monitor and advise management are associated with each other and
with firm performance. The alternative measures we examine focus on (1) variation in the complexity
of the firms and (2) additional time constraints placed on the directors. To account for complexity, we
focus on whether directors serve at large firms, firms with multiple business segments, or firms with
large R&D expenditures. To account for time constraints, we see if directors serve as inside directors at
their own firm, have multiple committee obligations, or serve on the boards of firms in different
industries.
Table 8 presents the correlation matrix between all of our busyness measures, while Table 9 presents
the analysis of how our alternative busyness proxies are associated with firm performance. The results
in Table 8 demonstrate that the alternative busyness measures are highly correlated with each other
and with those used in the prior literature. This suggests that they may add little in explaining firm
performance. The results presented in Table 9 are consistent with this notion. Specifically, we find that
all of the busyness measures have a negative association with Tobin’s Q. The adjusted R2 suggests that
the model specifications using the simple measures from the prior literature have just as much
explanatory power as the more complex alternatives that we examine here, which are more complex,
data intensive, and time consuming to construct.

Table 8. Correlation matrix.
Variables

Pearson correlation coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

(1) Busy directors (%)

1.00

(2) Busy board (1/0)

0.71 1.00

(3) Average # directorships

0.90 0.65 1.00

(4) Busy directors serving large firms (%)

0.95 0.69 0.88 1.00

(5) Busy directors serving firms with multiple business
0.92 0.66 0.86 0.90 1.00
segments (%)
(6) Busy directors serving firms with large R&D
expenditures (%)

0.89 0.64 0.82 0.85 0.84 1.00

(7) Busy directors serving different industry (%)

0.94 0.69 0.87 0.92 0.89 0.83 1.00

(8) Busy directors with multiple committees (%)

0.81 0.61 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.79 1.00

(9) Busy directors serving as insiders at their firm (%)

0.53 0.39 0.47 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.29 1.00

Notes: This table presents the correlations between the various measures of busy directors. Busy directors (%) is
the percentage of independent directors that hold three or more directorships. Busy board (1/0) is the indicator
that sets equal to one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold three or more directorships.
Average # directorships is the total number of directorships held by all of a firm’s independent directors, divided
by the number of independent directors. Busy directors serving large firms (%) is the fraction of independent
directors that serves on at least one firm whose total assets is above the sample median in the year. Busy
directors serving firms with multiple business segments (%) is the fraction of independent directors that serve
on at least one firm with more business segments than the median in the sample for the year. Busy directors
serving firms with large R&D expenditures (%) is the fraction of independent directors that serve on at least one
firm’s whose R&D expenditures are above the median in a year. Busy directors with multiple committees (%) is
the fraction of busy directors that serve on four or more committees. Busy directors serving different industry
(%) is the fraction of independent directors that serve on firms in at least two Fama–French 48 industries. Busy
directors serving as insiders at their firm (%) is the fraction of independent directors that are an insider on their
own firm’s board.

Table 9. Firm performance regressions with alternative measures of busy directors.
Model Measures of busy independent directors

Dependent Variables
Tobin’s
Q

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

ROA

Sales/Assets ROS

Busy directors (%)

−0.145** −0.009* −0.053***

−0.023**

Adjusted R2 (%)

68.54

77.71

77.99

Busy board (1/0)

−0.019

−0.005** −0.007

−0.01**

Adjusted R2 (%)

68.53

77.71

77.99

Average # directorships

−0.054** −0.004* −0.018***

−0.008**

Adjusted R2 (%)

68.54

77.99

Busy directors serving large firms (%)

−0.177** −0.009* −0.03

77.71

92.93
92.93
92.93

−0.025**

Model Measures of busy independent directors

Adjusted R2 (%)
(5)

(6)

(7)
(8)
(9)

Dependent Variables
Tobin’s
Q

ROA

Sales/Assets ROS

68.55

77.71

92.93

77.99

Busy directors serving firms with multiple business
−0.232*** −0.008 −0.043**
segments (%)

−0.012

Adjusted R2 (%)

68.56

77.70

77.98

Busy directors serving firms with large R&D
expenditures (%)

−0.084

−0.009* −0.056***

−0.02*

Adjusted R2 (%)

68.53

77.71

77.98

Busy directors with multiple committees (%)

−0.174** −0.006 −0.031

−0.023**

Adjusted R2 (%)

68.54

77.98

Busy directors serving different industry (%)

−0.207*** −0.007 −0.037*

−0.028***

Adjusted R2

68.56

77.99

Busy directors serving as insiders at their firm (%)

−0.252* −0.015 −0.014

−0.011

68.54

77.98

Adjusted

R2

(%)

77.70
77.70
77.71

92.93

92.93
92.93
92.93
92.92

Notes: This table presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the effect of busy directors on firm
performance, using various proxies for busy directors and controlling for firm-fixed effects. Tobin’s Q is
calculated as the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year plus the difference between the book
value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity at the end of the year, divided by the book
value of the firm’s assets at the end of the year. Return on assets is calculated as operating income before
depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and
the decrease in other current assets scaled by the average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total
assets. Sales/assets is total sales divided by total assets. Return on sales is computed as operating income over
net sales. Busy directors (%) is the percentage of independent directors that hold three or more directorships.
Busy board (1/0) is an indicator equal to one if 50% or more of the board’s independent directors hold three or
more directorships. Average # directorships is the total number of directorships held by all of a firm’s
independent directors, divided by the number of independent directors. Busy directors serving large firms (%) is
the fraction of independent directors that serve on at least one firm whose total assets is above the sample
median in the year. Busy directors serving firms with multiple business segments (%) is the fraction of
independent directors that serve on at least one firm with more business segments than the median in the
sample for the year. Busy directors serving firms with large R&D expenditures (%) is the fraction of independent
directors that serve on at least one firm’s whose R&D expenditures are above the median in a year. Busy
directors with multiple committees (%) is the fraction of busy directors that serve on four or more committees.
Busy directors serving different industry (%) is the fraction of independent directors that serve on firms in at
least two Fama–French 48 industries. Busy directors serving as insiders at their firm (%) is the fraction of
independent directors that are an insider on their own firm’s board. We control for year and industry fixed
effects A list of the other control variables used as well as details regarding their calculations is provided in
Appendix B.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level, respectively.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level, respectively.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level, respectively.

6. Conclusions
Prior work has documented both positive and negative relations between busy directors and firm
value. We attempt to reconcile these disparate results in the literature and explore whether or not
more comprehensive definitions of what constitutes a busy director affects inferences regarding this
association. In doing so, we focus on a more recent sample and find evidence consistent with the prior
literature. Specifically, when focusing on larger firms, namely S&P 500 firms, we find evidence of a
negative association between the presence of busy directors and firm performance. This is consistent
with Fich and Shivdasani’s (2006) analysis of the Forbes 500. However, when studying a larger sample
including non-S&P 500 firms, we find evidence that the presence of busy directors is positively related
to firm performance, consistent with Ferris et al. (2003). Our ability to find results consistent with both
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, Ferris et al., 2003 suggests that the conflicting findings of these papers are
potentially the result of differences in the samples studied.
However, the specific empirical approach used may also account for differences. Indeed, following the
arguments of Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, Brookman and Thistle, 2011, Coles and Li, 2011, and Graham
et al. (2012), once we control for firm fixed effects, we find a consistent negative relation between
busy directors and firm performance, regardless of the sample examined. Our finding of a consistent
negative association between busy directors and firm performance across samples in this analysis
reinforces the need for researchers to control for firm fixed effects in such analyses. Failing to control
for unobservable firm characteristics can result in a mis-specified model and potentially incorrect
inferences. Our results are also suggestive of causality running from busy board to (lower) firm value.
Furthermore, we find evidence that the link has weakened post-Sarbanes–Oxley.
Lastly, we examine whether or not the definition of what constitutes a busy director affects the
empirical association between busy directors and performance. Specifically, we examine alternatives
to the three board seat as a cutoff for busyness, proxies that account for the complexity of the firms
where the director serves, and time commitments. Our findings suggest that the relatively
straightforward definition used in the prior literature of a busy director as serving on three or more
boards, is appropriate and as informative as the more complex and data-intensive proxies that we
examine. This implies that future researchers can avoid the data collection and cleaning associated
with the busyness measures we examine and focus on the relatively straightforward proxy used in the
prior literature.

Appendix A. Sample construction
A.1. RiskMetrics

Our primary data source is RiskMetrics, which we obtain through ISS Governance Services. While the
data was initially provided by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), ISS acquired
RiskMetrics in 2005. Following the acquisition, in 2007 the methodology used for data collection was
changed. Thus, RiskMetrics provides two datasets: (1) the legacy version, covering 1996–2006, which
was collected using the old IRRC methodology and (2) the current version starting in 2007, that follows
the new ISS methodology. This change in the methodology reduced the number of variables collected.
The legacy version contained 79 variables while the current version contains only 64 variables.

Additionally, some data item names where changed, as was how some data was recorded.11 Combining
the two versions of the RiskMetrics dataset provides us with a sample of 193,467 director-year level
observations for which we have 61 variables in common across the two datasets.
We remove 20 observations from this sample as they appear to be duplicate observations.
Additionally, we remove all observations for P-COM 1999, as a board and director information across
years is constant. Due to the use of lagged variable, the sample period is between 1999 and 2008 and
there are 145,778 director-year observations and 15,501 firm-year observations.

A.2. Company IDs

RiskMetrics provides three company identifiers that can potentially be used to match with other
databases: six-digit CUSIP number, ticker, and company name. Of these three, the CUSIP is generally
regard as the more reliable for matching across databases. However, the CUSIP contains missing
observations, as well as coding errors. Specifically, the six digit CUSIP used in RiskMetrics is supposed
be the first six numbers in the standard eight digit CUSIP, but we find coding errors in this field. In
addition to the three general company identifiers, RiskMetrics provides several internal company
identifiers. The legacy version contains legacy_pps_id, and rt_id (for the period following RiskMetrics’s
acquisition by ISS), while the current version provides company_id, and rt_id. Unfortunately, none of
these identifiers uniquely identifies companies in the combined version of RiskMetrics. The specific
problem is that no single identifier covers all of a firm’s observations within the dataset. Therefore, we
create our own unique company identifier within RiskMetrics, coid. Assuming that each internal
identifier correctly identifies specific firm observations, we combine the three identifiers into a unique
company id. We start by setting coid to rt_id, we then fill in missing values for coid by expanding rt_id
to any observation that shares a legacy_pps_id. We then repeat this process using company_id. This
process successfully identifies all observations in our sample. We next merge our RiskMetrics data to
CRSP and Compustat.
This is not a simple matching procedure as the RiskMetrics identifier appears to change. Therefore, we
follow the methodology listed below.
1. Match observations based on six-digit CUSIP, ticker, and year.
2. Match remaining observations based on six-digit CUSIP and year.
3. Match remaining observations based on ticker and year.
However, this may result in multiple permnos for an individual company. To identify a unique permno
for each company:
1. If all permnos cover the entire sample period, we select the permno with the highest trading
volume.
2. If the permnos are mutually exclusive, we assume each is correct
3. If the permnos are not mutually exclusive, we assign the permno with the longest time
covered as the firm’s permno.
4. We manually identify the 79 firm-years that this methodology fails to identify.

A.3. Director-level information

In addition to creating a unique firm identifier, we also correct coding errors in the director-level
information. Director information, such as gender, should remain constant. Similarly, the year a
director’s tenure at a firm started should remain constant. To correct for these types of
inconsistencies, we perform the following steps: (1) extract all observations with missing and
inconsistent values, (2) if an observation has missing values but the rest of the observations provide
consistent values, then replace the missing observation with the consistent value, (3) if the values are
inconsistent through a director (or director-firm), replace the inconsistent values with the value that
appears the most frequently. Any inconsistencies remaining after these steps are manually corrected.12

A.4. CEO information

Riskmetrics does not explicitly identify a firm’s CEO. For the majority of firms we are able to identify a
firm’s CEO by combining the inside director indicator and the insider position variables. When this
criterion fails to identify the firm’s CEO, we use the following criteria: If a firm has only one insider on
the board, we classify that director as the CEO. Alternatively, we classify inside directors that are the
chairman of the board as the CEO. If we are still unable to identify the CEO, we use EXECUCOMP, and
proxy statements to identify the CEO. After checking proxy statements, we are unable to identify the
CEO for 55 firm-year observations. We drop these observations from the sample.

Appendix B. Variable definitions
Dependent variables
Tobin’s Q

The market value of the firm’s equity plus the difference between the book
value of the firm’s assets and the book value of the firm’s equity, divided by
the book value of the firm’s assets. All data is from year end

ROA

The sum of operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in
receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and
the decrease in other current assets, divided by the average of the beginning
and year end book value of total assets

Sales as a percent of
assets

Sales divided by total assets

ROS

The sum of operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in
receivables, the decrease in inventory, the increase in current liabilities, and
the decrease in other current assets, divided sales

Busyness variables
Conventional
Busy director (%)

The percentage of independent directors who hold three or more
directorships

Busy boards

An indicator set to 1 if over 50% of the board’s independent directors are
busy

Average # directorships

The total number of directorships held by independent directors, divided by
the number of independent directors

Alternative
Busy director serving a
large firm

The proportion of directors serving on three or more boards, where at least
one firm has assets above the sample median

Busy director serving a
firm with multiple
segments

The fraction of directors serving on three or more boards, where at least one
firm has more business segments than the sample median

Busy director serving a
firm with large R&D
expenditures

The fraction of directors serving on three or more boards, where at least one
firm has R&D expenditures above the sample median

Busy director serving as The proportion of directors serving on three or more boards, when they also
an insider at own firm serve as an inside director on their company’s board
Busy director with
multiple committees

The fraction of directors serving on three or more boards who also serve on
more than four committees, which is the median number of committee
appointments for an independent director

Busy director serving in The fraction of directors serving on three or more boards, where at least two
multiple industries
firms are in different Fama-French 48 industries
Control variables
Log (CEO Directorships) The natural logarithm of the number of directorships held by the CEO.
Industry director (%)

The percentage of busy directors with at least 50% of their directorships in
the same Fama-French 48 industry code

Director ownership

Quintile measure of the combined board’s voting control, excluding the CEO

Board interlock

An indicator which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s CEO sits on the board of
one of the independent director’s firms

CEO ownership

The percentage of voting power that the CEO controls

Log(board size)

The natural logarithm of the total number of directors on the firm’s board

Board committees

The number of board committees.

Independent director
(%)

The percentage of independent directors on the board

Log (sales)

Log of total sales

Firm age

The number of years the firm is in the CRSP database

Growth opportunities

Depreciation expense scaled by total sales

Business segments

The number of business segments reported in COMPUSTAT
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10We note that we obtain similar results with these proxies as well.
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director owns less than 1% of voting power (ownless1) is recorded as 1 or 0 in the legacy
version and ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in the current version of RiskMetrics.
12As for age, female, country_of_empl, dirsince, and classification, we correct 22, 64, 222, 52, and 10
director-firm-year observations, respectively.

